Monarchisms in the Age of Enlightenment (3 - Bayle and Hume on Monarchy)

Bayle and Hume on Monarchy, Scepticism, and Forms of Government - Sally Jenkinson

For the most part, people tend to speak favorably of the form of government of their home country. It is typical for Americans to praise a republican form of government and to praise the American Revolution and to scorn a monarchial form of government since that is what the American republic broke away from. But Bayle and Hume approach their theories of government from a slightly different perspective. Both are under monarchies but "[b]oth followed the sceptical mode in philosophy, and both applied critical argument to received constitutional ideas of their age" (Monarchisms, 62). Though sceptical this does not mean that their views were not pragmatic. They were "committed to a the promotion of an Enlightened society" and while long known for their philosophical works, are now becoming more known for their political works as well (62).

Scepticism can be understood different ways in different contexts. For the purpose of the study on Hume and Bayle, it is necessary to come to a definition on how scepticism can be applied to their approaches on political philosophy. "In epistomology the word 'scepticism' is used mainly in opposition to to the word 'dogmatism'" (63). Dogmatic thinkers appeal to authority to support their arguments and pre-conceived ideas. Sceptical thinkers refrain from passing judgment. This is the trend that is seen in the writings of Bayle and Hume. Sceptical thinkers will question theories "of government advanced by a rival" (64). They may not necessarily promote a theory. He questions "both the validity of a theory, [and] also the good faith of those who advance it" (64). Finally, the sceptical thinker puts in place an alternative theory to the one demolished.

The three main classical theories on monarchy are monarchy as rule by one person, monarchy as rule by one person in the interests of all, and monarchy as power transferred by inheritance. In Aristotle's six-fold system, "government could be that of one, the few, or the many" (65). Thus, the inverse relations of monarchy, aristocracy, and polity as opposed to tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. But this does not mean that a monarchy need not be governed in such a way as to promote the interests of all. And for monarchies, it was commonly argued that if power was routinely transferred to the ruler's heir, "there was less risk of violent conflict among contenders for office" (66). Thus, a monarchy was typically seen as a guarantor of more stability.

Bayle's position is a critique of those who praise a certain form of government over another. Bayle begins with a critique of Hobbes. Hobbes "had once attempted through his translation of Thucydides to persuade his compatriots that disorder and confusion follow from the republican form of government" (67). But this would never convince someone with anti-monarchial positions as they would already approach the question with the position that republican governments provide order. Such was Bayle's reasoning. "Bayle notes that different circumstances produce different forms of government" but the one that keeps the peace the best is the one that is to be praised (67). Bayle, in his Dictionnaire, makes similar arguments against hereditary power. While other forms of government have their weak points, they are not "as are kings, susceptible to infancy or decrepitude" (67-68). The reign of Charles VI "precipitated 'the darkest and most turbulent dissention' in France" (68).

Hume makes the attempt to argue for a hereditary monarchy. In his Treatise on Human Nature, he reasons that "men are commonly induced to place the son of their late monarchy on the throne and suppose him to inherit his father's authority...the presumed consent of the father, the imitation of succession to to private families, the interest, which the state has in chusing the person, who is most powerful, and has the most numerous followers; all these reasons lead men to prefer the son of their late monarch to any other person" (68-69). Hume is inclined to the position that "humankind is apt to base its institutions on imagination, so that even an act of chance, conquest, is characteristically transformed into a tradition" (69). If government is supposed to secure society from such convulsions, then the greatest risk to disorder would be a doubt emerging in the line of succession. Thus, a hereditary monarchy would erase such doubts. Hume's belief is that governments eventually arise naturally. Government development is to arise naturally and the most natural form of government would have to be a one ruler society, a monarchy. Yet, he also maintains that government can be oppressive, so oppressive that people might be justified in revolting against it (70).

In his "weak case for hereditary monarchy and prudential, retrospective, case for resistance to tyranny, Hume manages to defend the status quo of the constitution of church and state in Britain in the eighteenth century" (70-71). The Revolution of 1688 is defended, "whereby the monarchy was transferred from a Catholic dynasty to a Protestant dynasty...he defends the establishment...of a new hereditary monarchy...'the linear heir' - is likely to provide a more stable transfer...the mixed hereditary monarchy is superior to the absolute hereditary monarchies of the European continent" (71). The civil sovereign must "protect society from disorder as a means to the end of promoting enlightenment" (71).

For both Bayle and Hume, "[a] government must be neither so tyrannical that it is overthrown, nor so pusillanimous that it dissolves into tumult and chaos" (72). Experience taught that society was at risk if the monarch did not support some form of public religion, though it was not necessary as to which religious preference the monarch supported. Bayle and Hume defended "the absolute sovereignty of any regime as a necessary...condition of public peace" (73). Diplomatically, monarchy had to be supported in France, republicanism in Geneva, and mixed government in the Netherlands. Neither accept dogmatical ways of thinking in "their preferred alternatives to the ideas of their opponents" (74).